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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient
opponent, player 2. As usual in reputation models, we suppose that the patient player’s
type is private information, and that he may be a “commitment type” who is locked into
playing a particular strategy. We investigate the extent to which an uncommitted or
“normal” type of patient player can exploit his less patient opponent’s uncertainty to
maintain a reputation for playing like a commitment type.
Most previous work on reputation effects has supposed that player 2 is in fact
completely myopic, or equivalently that player 2 corresponds to a sequence of short run
players (see Kreps and Wilson (1982) , Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and
Levine (1989, 1992)).
2 Since a myopic player 2 will play a short-run best response in each
period to that period’s expected play, the best possible commitment for the long run player
is to the Stackelberg strategy for the corresponding static game.
This paper considers the case in which the patient player, player 1, has discount factor
d 1 near 1, while his opponent, player 2, is an infinite-lived player who discounts future
payoffs with a smaller discount factor d 2 . Perhaps the best way to interpret this as-
sumption of unequal discount factors is to interpret the model as a shorthand for a situ-2
ation where player 1 faces a large number of identical player 2’s, each of whom observe all
previous play. Under one interpretation the player 2’s alternate play so that for example
the first player 2 moves in periods 1, N+1, etc. Alternatively, the first player 2 might move
in periods 1 to N, the second in N+1 to 2N, and so on. Under either interpretation, the key
is that player 1 cares more about future payoffs of this game than player 2 does, because
he will be playing in more future periods.
3
  A game with a non-myopic opponent differs from one with a myopic opponent in two
main ways. First, because a non-myopic opponent cares about future payoffs, the static
Stackelberg strategy is no longer necessarily the best possible commitment: Higher payoffs
can sometimes be attained by the use of rewards and punishments. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, for example, “tit-for-tat” is a better commitment against a non-myopic opponent
than the Stackelberg strategy of defecting. Second, it may be difficult to demonstrate that
one is using a strategy with rewards and punishments unless these rewards and
punishments are occasionally carried out. This is similar to the way in which incorrect off-
path beliefs can weaken reputation effects in the play of extensive-form games against
myopic opponents (Fudenberg and Levine (1989)).
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Our main assumption is that player 1 does not observe player 2’s intended action, but
only sees an imperfect signal of it, as in a model of moral hazard. We assume that the
support of the distribution of signals is independent of how player 2 plays. Intuitively, this
ensures that every reward and punishment in player 1’s strategy will occasionally be trig-
gered, so that player 2 will learn how player 1 responds to all sequences of public
outcomes. As a result, player 1’s equilibrium payoff is bounded below by what he could
get through commitment in the repeated game. In particular, if player 2 is sufficiently3
patient, player 1 gets approximately the greatest feasible payoff consistent with individual
rationality of player 2. 
This conclusion holds with an arbitrarily small amount of noise. However, as the
amount of noise shrinks, the patient player’s discount factor must be increasingly close to
one to ensure that its Nash equilibrium payoff is close to its limit value. Consequently, our
result is of the most relevance when the amount of noise is “significant.”
The first general study of reputation with two non-myopic players is Schmidt (1993),
who studied perfect observability. He showed that the long-run player can guarantee at
least the payoff he would get from precommitment to a static strategy that minmaxes his
opponent. This is a good bound in some games, but in others, such as the prisoner’s
dilemma, it imposes no restrictions beyond those implied by individual rationality.
Subsequently Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas (1995) provided tight bounds in the case of
perfect observability; Cripps and Thomas (1994) provide the parallel result when both
players have time-average payoffs. In each of these papers, reputation effects need not
allow the patient player to obtain as high a payoff as he could were he able to publicly
commit himself to follow any strategy of his choice.
The key point is that with perfectly observed actions, the problem of off-path beliefs
can prevent player 1 from obtaining the payoff he would most prefer. Schmidt (1993)
gives an example of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which player 2’s inability to learn the
strategy played off the equilibrium path prevents player 1 from achieving the payoff he
would get with a public commitment. This example is based on the presence of a
“perverse” type who plays like the “good” commitment type on the equilibrium path, but
responds to deviations in a history dependent way. Cripps, Schmidt, and Thomas (1995)4
show that the perverse type is not required if we consider only Nash equilibria. Their
Theorem 2 applies to games with observed actions where the patient player is either
“normal” or plays an arbitrary finitely-complex strategy. It shows that there is a Nash
equilibrium where player 1’s payoff is not substantially above the most he could obtain by
playing a constant action, with player 2 choosing the individually rational response to this
action that player 1 likes least.
In Section 5 we provide an example that shows the assumption of imperfect
observability can in general not be dispensed with, even if we restrict to perfect Bayesian
equilibria. The example shows that with perfect observability of actions there are perfect
Bayesian equilibria of the infinitely repeated game in which player 1’s payoff is bounded
away from the Stackelberg payoff.
Finally, we should acknowledge that Aoyagi (1994) independently obtains a result
similar to ours for the case where player 1 maximizes his time-average payoff while player
2 discounts. Aoyagi’s paper differs in interpreting the noise as “trembles,” and, more
significantly, in considering a complex class of “commitment types” that may be empty in
some games, but the basic intuition for his results is the same.
To illustrate an application of our Theorems, as well as how they differ from the
bounds of Cripps, Schmidt, and Thomas (1995), we examine a version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. It should be noted that the bound developed by Schmidt (1993) and by Cripps,
Schmidt and Thomas (1995) does not imply any restriction on the Nash equilibria of this
game: the best player 1 can get while minmaxing player 2 is his own minmax. We start
with a traditional prisoner’s dilemma (see Figure 1). We add incomplete observability, by
supposing that if a player chooses a particular action then there is a small chance that the5
realized action will be different. In particular suppose that conditional on choosing action
C (or D) the realized action will be C (D) with probability 1- e  and D (C) with probability
e . For this example a simple calculation shows that the greatest socially feasible payoff
for player 1 that gives player 2 at least the minmax is 3 2 2 / - e . Our results imply that if
player 2 is patient, then a more patient player 1 will receive a payoff close to 3/2 in every
Nash equilibrium of this prisoner’s dilemma with commitment types.
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2. THE MODEL
Let g denote a stage game between two players, player 1 (the patient player) and player 2.
We denote by  A A 1 2 ,  the finite (pure) action sets of the two players in the stage game with
generic elements a a 1 2 ,  , and use a a 1 1 2 2 ˛ ˛ ~ , ~ A A    for mixed actions. We denote by  A A , ~  
the corresponding spaces of profiles. At the end of the stage game both players observe a
stochastic outcome drawn from a finite set,  y Y ˛ , but players do not observe each
other’s action. The probability distribution over outcomes depends on the action profile
and is given as r(| ) ￿ a ; for mixed actions r a (| ) ￿  is defined in the obvious way. Stage game
payoffs, denoted ui( ) a , take the form u a u a y ya i i i y ( ) ( , ) ( ) ”￿ r  and therefore the realized
payoffs do not convey additional information about the other player’s action.
We consider an infinitely repeated game, G
¥ , constructed from g as follows. The
public history at date t, h
t , is the sequence of past realizations of the outcome y. Player i’s
private history at t, hi
t , is the sequence of actions i chose in previous periods. Let H,  H1,
and  H2 denote the sets of infinite public and private histories, for player 1 and 2
respectively.6
Player 1 can be one of countably many types, w ˛W. These types are drawn from a
common knowledge prior m  assigning positive probability to all points in W. Player 1’s
type is private information. We focus on a particular type w 0 ˛W, which we refer to as
the normal type. Type w 0  seeks to maximize the average present value of u1 using the
discount factor d 1, while player 2 maximizes the average present value of u2 with the
discount factor d 2 . Types of player 1 other than type w 0  have von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences over sequences of own actions and public outcomes, but these
are not necessarily representable in a time separable form.
A behavior strategy for a type of player 1 or a behavior strategy for player 2 specifies a
time indexed sequence of maps from private (for that player) and public histories to mixed
actions (for that player). We denote these by s 1 and s 2 respectively. We also define
ui
t( , ) s s 1 2  to be the corresponding period t expected utility. Finally, a behavior strategy
for player 1,  , specifies a behavior strategy for each type. A Nash equilibrium is a
behavior strategy for each player such that given the opponent’s behavior strategy, no
other behavior strategy yields a distribution over time sequences of own actions and public
outcomes that is preferred to that in the proposed equilibrium. It is quite easy to show by
taking limits of finite truncations of this infinite game that Nash equilibria exist.
6 Let
E1 1 2 ( , ) d d  denote the least (inf) expected payoff to player 1 conditional on type w 0  in
any Nash equilibrium.
Say that a behavior strategy for player 1 has bounded recall if there exists a number
N  such that play at time t  is entirely determined by the history between t N -  and t -1.7
A type of player 1 whose preferences make the type behavior strategy s 1 strictly
dominant is called committed to that strategy, and we write the type as w s ( ) 1 .
We make four key assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1: If s 1 is a pure strategy of bounded recall, then w s ( ) 1 ˛W, that is, it
has positive probability.
ASSUMPTION 2: If r a a r a a ( , ) ( , ) ￿ = ￿ ¢ 1 2 1 2 , then a a 1 1 = ¢.
ASSUMPTION 3: The support of r a ( ) ￿  is independent of a 2.
Define the (pure strategy) minmax for player 2:
u u a
a a 2 2
1 2
” minmax ( ).
ASSUMPTION 4: There exists a pure profile a such that u a u 2 2 ( ) > .
Assumption 1 ensures there are enough irrational types. (Since the set of bounded-
recall strategies is countable this is consistent with our restriction to a countable number of
types.) Assumption 2 requires that regardless of the play of player 2 the information re-
vealed by the outcomes identifies the action of player 1. If it fails, player 2 may play an
action that precludes him from learning what stage-game action player 1 is playing, pre-
venting player 1 from developing a reputation, even when player 2 is myopic . Note that
the assumption is satisfied if player 1’s actions are perfectly observed, as in the previous
papers on reputation effects with two long-run players.
Assumption 3 is the substantive assumption: It says that player 2 cannot determine the
set of possible outcomes through his own action. Note that this assumption does not
require that player 1’s action be imperfectly observed, and indeed, whether player 1’s ac-
tion is observed or not is irrelevant.8
Assumption 4 says that there is a profile that is better for player 2 than the pure
strategy minmax payoff. If we used mixed strategies in place of pure, this would be a mild
non-degeneracy condition: failure would mean that the indifference of player 2 might well
make him immune to threats by player 1. We restrict attention to the pure strategy minmax
in order to avoid the complications involved in maintaining a reputation for playing a
mixed strategy.
7 The existence of a profile better for player 2 than the pure strategy min-
max rules out some interesting games, but the assumption is satisfied in other games of
interest, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the battle of the sexes.
Let G
N
0  be the complete-information game corresponding to the N period repetition of
g; players discount their payoffs in G
N
0  using the same discount factors d d 1 2  and   as in the
infinitely repeated game.
8 Let G
N  be the N period game with discount factors d d 1 2  and  ,
type space W, and prior m.
Before analyzing reputation in our model, we calculate as a benchmark how much
player 1 might hope to get by precommitting. First we define a set of payoffs for player 1.
DEFINITION 1: v V 1 1 2 ˛ ( ) d  if and only if for every e >0 there is an N and a pure
strategy s 1
N  such that for every best response s 2
N  to s 1
N  in G
N
0 ,
( / ) ( , ) 1 1 1 2
1





= ￿ ‡ -  .
  Through a public precommitment (to a pure strategy) a patient player can guarantee
himself v V 1 2 1 2 ( ) sup ( ) d d = .
9
3. AN IMPATIENT PLAYER 29
Our main result is:
THEOREM 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then
liminf ( , ) ( )
d d d d
1 1 1 1 2 1 2 ﬁ ‡ E v .
In other words, if player 1 is very patient, then he gets nearly as much in any Nash
equilibrium as the greatest amount consistent with the short run player choosing a best re-
sponse in a finite truncation of the game.
The idea is that if player 1 commits to an appropriate bounded recall strategy and
player 2 plays a best response to it, then player 1 gets a payoff very close to the lower
bound given above. Note that since the strategy has bounded recall there is a type who is
committed to playing this strategy. In the usual reputational story, this would mean that if
player 1 chooses this strategy, player 2 must either play a best response to it, or come to
believe that he faces a committed type. The situation here is complicated by the need to
show that player 2 can learn the punishment strategy of player 1 without deviating: this is
where Assumption 3 comes in.
We proceed via several Lemmas. Our initial focus is on the response of player 2 to
bounded recall strategies in G
N
0 .
LEMMA 1:  For every h > 0 there exists an  N, , d e 1 1 0 < >  and pure strategy s 1
N  for
player 1 in G
N




0 , then the payoff to player 1 is at least v1 2 ( ) d h - .
PROOF: Omitted, see Celentani et al. (1993).
If s
N  is a profile in G
N
0 , let  p
N ( ) s  be the probability distribution over N-length
sequences of public outcomes induced by r . Notice that this is a finite vector.10




N N N N ( , ) (~ , ) s s s s g 1 2 1 2 - <  and s 2
N  is an e -best response by player 2 to s 1
N , then it
is a 2e -best response to ~ s 1
N .
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PROOF: We identify type behavior strategies by player 1 that differ only at information sets that are unreachable given that strategy. It is sufficient to show that 
closed set in the domain is closed, so it suffices to show that  p
N ( , ) ￿ s 2  is continuous and 1-
1.  Continuity is obvious. To show that  p
N ( , ) ￿ s 2  is 1-1 suppose to the contrary that
p p
N N N N (~ , ) ( , ) s s s s 1 2 1 2 = , but that s s 1 1
N N ,~  are not equivalent. Let ( , , ) h h h
t t t
1 2  be a triple
consisting of a public and private histories (of the same length) possible under s 1
N  such
that  ~ ( , ) ( , ) s s 1 1 1 1
N t t N t t h h h h „ . By Assumption 2 it follows that
r s s r s s (~ ( , ), ( , )) ( ( , ), ( , )) 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
N t t N t t N t t N t t h h h h h h h h „ .
Since h has positive probability under s 1
N  for some ~ s 2
N  by Assumption 3 it has
positive probability under s s 1 2
N N ,  (and by hypothesis the same probability under
( ~ s s 1 2
N N , )). This contradicts  p p
N N N N (~ , ) ( , ) s s s s 1 2 1 2 = . Q.E.D.
For a given d 1 let M(K,  ) be the finite set of probability distributions over types of
player 1 that can be generated by Bayesian updating with no more than K observations of
player 1’s play.
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For any fixed N, we can partition the set of histories into a sequence of blocks of
length N.  Given a probability distribution r over the space W· · · H H H 1 2 of types of
player 1 and public and private infinite histories (in particular, given the distribution
induced by a Nash equilibrium of G
¥ ) we can then associate every infinite history that has
positive probability under r with a sequence of N-period games of the same form as G
N ,11
where the prior beliefs in the N-period game beginning in period N(k-1)+1 are those given
by Bayes rule applied to the distribution r and to the specified finite history
( , , )
( ) ( ) ( ) h h h




1 1 . We will denote this game by G
N k , , where the dependence
on the infinite history h is left implicit.
For any  , k, and for any probability distribution m' over player 1’s types, let
f m 1
1 1 k N k h ( , ', )









1 1 k N k N N N k h h ( , ', )( ) '( ) ( | , )
( ) ( ) - + - + =￿ .
Finally, for a given s 2, let s 2
N t h ( ) denote the strategy in G
N
0  corresponding to the play
of s 2 in periods t+1,...,t+N.
LEMMA 3: Fix a Nash equilibrium ( , ) s 2  and suppose for some N and s 1
N ,   is
such that type w 0  plays s 1
N  in each G
N k , . For every l g > > 0 0 , ,    K  there is an L such
that if m' ( , ) ˛M K  the probability is less than l  that there are more than  L stages
G
N k ,  with
p h p h h
N N N k k N k N N k ( , ( )) ( ( , ', ), ( ))





1 1 - + - + - + - ‡ .
PROOF: This is a restatement of Theorem 4.1 in Fudenberg and Levine (1992).
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Fix a Nash equilibrium ( , ) s 2 . For any number h > 0 we
may choose  N, , d e 1 1 0 < > ,s 1
N  so that Lemma 1 is satisfied for the tolerance h / 4 and
hence if player 2 plays an e -best response to s 1
N  in G
N
0  then the payoff to player 1 in G
N
0
is at least v1 2 ( ) d h - /4. The idea is to consider what happens when player 1 of type w 012
repeatedly plays s 1
N  and player 2 plays a best response. Our conclusion follows by
demonstrating that if player 1 is more patient than d 1 he gets at least v1 2 ( ) d h - .
To analyze the best response of player 2, we fix any integer k  so that
d e d
k
2 2 2 2 1 4
N u u ( ) ( ) / max min - < - . Set  N N '=k . Apply Lemma 2 to G
N
0
' where the tol-
erance is e d ( ) / 1 2 2 -  to find a value for g . Apply Lemma 3 to blocks G
N' using this
same value of g , and choosing l  such that ( ( ) )(max min ) / 1 1 4 1 1 - - - < l h
k u u . We
refer to blocks G
N k ',  in which
p h p h h
N N N k k N k N N k ( , ( )) ( ( , ', ), ( ))





1 1 - + - + - + - ‡
as anomalous.
Strategy s 2 is at worst an e d ( ) / 1 2 2 -  best response to f m 1
1 1 1 1 k N k N k h h ( , ( ), )
'( ) '( ) - + - +
in G
N k ', , where m( )
'( ) h
N k- + 1 1  denotes 2’s posterior beliefs given h
N k '( ) - + 1 1 (this is the case
since d e d
k
2 2 2 2 1 4
N u u (max min ) ( ) / - < - ). By Lemma 2 player 2 is playing an e d ( ) 1 2 -
best response to the k -fold repetition of s 1
N  except in the anomalous blocks.
Consequently, except in anomalous blocks, player 2 is playing an e -best response to s 1
N
in the first N periods of each N' block. Lemma 1 then shows that player 1 gets at least
v1 2 2 ( ) / d h -  in the first N periods of each non-anomalous block. Furthermore, with
probability at least 1- l  there are at most  L anomalous blocks.
Now consider the infinitely repeated game beginning in any period
kN k + £ £ - 1 1 1 ,  k . This is identical to the game that begins in period 1, except that the
prior of player 2 may have changed. We may again organize this game into blocks of
length N' and, since Lemma 3 applies to all priors reachable during periods up to N', the13
previous argument shows that for every k  there are at most  L anomalous blocks with
probability at least 1- l  . Thus with probability at least ( ) 1- l
k  in the overall game there
are at most kL anomalous blocks. The payoff of player 1 is therefore at least
d d h d
k k k k
1 1 2 1 1 3 4 1
L N L N v u ( ) / ( )min - + -
Letting d 1 1 ﬁ  gives the desired result. Q.E.D.14
4. A PATIENT PLAYER 2
Our second Theorem shows that as d 2 1 ﬁ  player 1 can approximately obtain the
maximum feasible payoff that gives player 2 his pure strategy minmax payoff. Note that
this bound is derived by taking a particular order of limits. First, we derive a lower bound
on player 1’s payoff as d 1 1 ﬁ , and then we ask how this bound behaves as d 2 1 ﬁ . Let
V
* denote the convex hull of feasible payoffs that are at least as great as the pure strategy
minmax. By V1
* we denote the projection of V
*onto the payoffs of player 1.
THEOREM 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then
liminf liminf ( , ) max
*
d d d d
2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ﬁ ﬁ ‡ E V
It is worth noting that if we allowed types of player 2, this result would remain valid,
and the proof (and Theorem 1 from which it follows) would involve only notational
changes. However, we cannot turn the Theorem around and use the fact that there are
types player 2 to find a bound on his payoffs similar to that for player 1: The validity of
Theorem 2 depends crucially on the order of limits.
Note also that the definition of V
* makes use of the pure strategy minmax. As was
argued in Section 2, we allow player 1 to establish a reputation only for a pure strategy,
since allowing him to establish a reputation for mixed strategy punishments would require
the existence of a continuum of types that would make the notation significantly heavier. If
we allowed a reputation for mixed strategies, we could use the usual feasible individually
rational set, and replace the inequality in Theorem 2 with an equality.
The proof of Theorem 2 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and the following
Lemma.15
LEMMA 4: For any v v v = ( , ) 1 2  with v V ˛int
* there is a d 2  such that, for d d 2 2 > ,
v V 1 1 2 ˛ ( ) d .
Remark: We should emphasize that this Lemma concerns the complete information
game, where reputation plays no role. The Lemma is thus more closely related to the
literature on repeated games than to that on reputation effects, and indeed our proof uses
“review strategies” of the sort introduced in Radner’s (1981, 1985) study of repeated
agency games, and subsequently used in a number of papers on the folk Theorem in
repeated games. Despite this close link to the repeated game literature, the Lemma we
need does not seem to be a direct consequence of previous work, so we give a complete
proof in the Appendix.
5. EXAMPLE
In this Section we give an example that shows that the conclusions of Theorems 1 and 2 fail with
perfectly observable actions even if the equilibrium concept is strengthened to perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
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Suppose that the following stage game (see Figure 2) is played repeatedly with perfect observability.
Player 1 is the row player and player 2 the column player. Notice that the Stackelberg payoff here is 2,
with player 1 playing C and player 2 playing c. Suppose that there are two types of patient player: type
w 0  is the normal type and type w1 always plays C; note that there are no perverse types. The prior
probability of the commitment type is m1 001 =. . For simplicity we assume that there is a public
randomization device.
We claim that for all d d 1 2 99 ‡ ‡  .  there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
13 in which type w 0 ’s
payoff is no more than 1; in particular this is the case if d d 1 2 99 = ‡  . .
14 The equilibrium strategies we16
describe below can be adapted to support any payoff of type w 0  player 1 strictly above his minmax
payoff of 2/3 if d d d 1 2 > >  for some d <1.
Notice that if player 1 ever plays D, player 2 learns for certain that 1 is the normal type; at this point
every equilibrium of the game where 1 is known to be normal (the “complete-information game”) is a
continuation equilibrium of the original game. For this reason, it is useful to consider the perfect
equilibria of the complete-information repeated game. First, there are three static equilibria: (2,2) and (1,-
1) are pure strategy equilibria, and there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which player 1 plays C with
probability 1/3 and player 2 plays c with probability 1/3; the payoff vector to this mixed strategy
equilibrium is (2/3,-2/3). Naturally, the infinite repetition of any of these static equilibria is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the repeated game. Moreover, any payoff vector ( , ) u u 1 2  in the convex hull of the
pure strategy payoffs that satisfies  ( , ) (. , . ) u u 1 2 687 646 ‡ -  can also be obtained in a perfect
equilibrium. These payoffs can be achieved by strategies that specify a repeated public randomization
yielding ( , ) u u 1 2  each period along the equilibrium path, with play switching to the static mixed strategy
equilibrium if any player deviates.
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Finally, when the two players have different discount factors, there are socially feasible payoffs that
are not in the convex hull of pure strategy payoffs. Call a sequence of expected present values
( ( ), ( )) v t v t 1 2  socially feasible if there is a strategy profile that gives rise to this sequence. If in each
period  ( ( ), ( )) (. , . ) v t v t 1 2 687 646 ‡ - , then each payoff vector in the sequence is a perfect equilibrium
payoff: again the punishment is reversion to the static mixed strategy equilibrium. A particular example of
such payoffs are any payoffs of the form ( , ) (. , ) d d
t t
1 1 2 2 687 0 u u ‡  where ( , ) u u 1 2  is an element of the
convex hull of pure strategy payoffs. (Note that payoffs of this form need not themselves be a convex
combination of pure strategy payoffs.) Such payoff sequences can be realized by playing (C,d) starting in
period 1 and for t  periods, and then switching to the stationary equilibrium ( , ) u u 1 2 . That this non-
stationary sequence is an equilibrium follows from17






2 1 1 2 2 687 0 = ‡ ‡
- - - - d d d d
t t t t    t £ + t 1.
 We will now describe a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the incomplete information
game in which type w 0 ’s equilibrium payoff is exactly equal to 1. We will describe the
equilibrium through its equilibrium path and continuation equilibria that arise in response
to deviations.
The Equilibrium Path: Along the equilibrium path player 1 always plays C while a (.5,.5)
public randomization determines whether player 2 chooses d or c. This implies that both
players get a present value of 1. No information about player 1’s type is revealed on the
equilibrium path, so player 2 does not update his beliefs.
Deviations from the equilibrium path:
If both players deviate simultaneously both deviations are ignored.
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If either player is the only deviator in a period in which player 2 is supposed to play c,
the deviation is ignored. This is consistent with equilibrium, since such deviations do not
yield a short term gain.
If player 1 is the only deviator in a period where 2 plays d, player 1 is revealed to be a
normal type, and play switches to the repeated mixed strategy equilibrium of the complete
information game. In this case, the deviation yields ( ) / 1 2 3 1 1 - + d d  which is less than the
equilibrium value of 1 for any d 1.
Finally, if player 2 is the only deviator in a period in which 2 is supposed to play d, no
information is revealed about player 1’s type, and play switches to a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the incomplete information game that we refer to as the player 2
punishment equilibrium. We verify below that the expected present value to player 2 in18
this punishment equilibrium is no greater than .81. Since 1 1 2 81 2 2 ‡ - ￿ + ( ) . d d   , this will
imply that  player 2 has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium path.
Player 2 Punishment Equilibrium: Along the equilibrium path, play has two phases.
The first phase lasts at most t  periods, where d d
t t
2 2
1 04 ‡ ‡
+ . . In this phase, the normal
type of player 1 mixes between C, D as described below, while player 2 chooses d.  The
first phase ends when either time runs out (e.g. after t periods) or when player 1 plays D.
If time runs out play switches to the cooperative equilibrium in which regardless of
observed play both types of player 1 play C and player 2 plays c. This is clearly a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
If player 1 plays D in the t-th period of the punishment equilibrium, he reveals his type
and in the following period play switches to an equilibrium of the complete information
game in which (C,d) is played up until and including period t ,  and whose present value
payoffs are ( ( ), ( )) d d
t t
1 1 2 2
- - t t u t u t , where



















t t  .
It can easily be checked that the vector ( ( ), ( )) u t u t 1 2  is socially feasible for all 1£ £ t t ,
and that
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) (. ,. ) d d d d
t t t t




2 1 1 79 79
- - - - ‡ ‡
t t u t u t u u
so from our earlier analysis these are indeed perfect equilibrium payoffs of the complete
information game.
Notice that the payoffs to player 1 following play of D are calibrated so that he is
exactly indifferent between C and D, implying that he is willing to use a mixed strategy
during the first phase, as we have specified. The exact mixing probabilities player 1 uses19
will be determined, as usual,  by the consideration of his opponent’s incentives, to which
we now we turn.
If player 2 deviates in a period when the realization of player 1’s strategy is C,  the
deviation is ignored.
If player 2 deviates in the first phase and the realization of player 1’s action is D, then
play switches to the static mixed strategy equilibrium of the complete information game
where player 1 is known to be the normal type.
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To show that the deviation is not optimal for player 2, we must now specify the
randomization probabilities for player 1 during the first phase of the punishment
equilibrium, and the corresponding beliefs for player 2 conditional on observing a string of
C played by player 1 in all t £ t during the first phase. These in turn will determine player
2’s expected payoff from conforming to the specified strategies at such histories, which in
turn will determine whether player 2 can gain by deviating.
  To define the randomization probabilities, denote by m t  player 2’s subjective
probability that player 1 is a commitment type in the t-th period of the first phase.
Let p = - - 1 6 1 2 ( ) d .  In the t-th period of this phase, type w 0  chooses C with
probability p p t t t = - - ( )/ ( ) m m 1 , so that the overall probability that player 1 chooses C
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.





for d 2 99 >. .
18 Therefore, since  p t t > £ £ m t , 1 , pt  is greater than 0.
Let V
t
2  denote player 2’s expected payoff in period t of the first phase of the
punishment equilibrium. To show that player 2 loses by deviating in the first phase of  the
punishment equilibrium, we first provide a lower bound for V
t
2 , 1£ £ t t .
After the first t  periods of the punishment equilibrium, the continuation payoff of
player 2 is either 2, if time ran out, or 2 1 1 1
1 - -
- + ( ) /( ) d d
t t , if in the first phase the
realization of player 1’s strategy was D in period t, where 1£ £ t t . It is therefore easy to
see that V
t























We claim that player 2 has no incentive to deviate in the punishment equilibrium if
2 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2
1 ( ) [ ( ) ( / )] ( )( )( ) - + + - - £ - - - +
+ + d d d d d pV p p V
t t .
To see this, note that the right-hand side of the inequality is player 2’s expected payoff
from conforming to d, and that the left-hand side is an overestimate of the his payoff from
playing c¸ since it calculates player 2’s current-period payoff as if player 1’s realized action
were sure to be C.21
Note next that this inequality is equivalent to
2 1 6 1 2 3 6 1 1 1 6 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( ( )) ( / ) ( )( )( ) ( ) - + - - £ - - - + -




2 78 ‡ .  this inequality holds if
2 6 2 3 6 1 1 6 078 2 2 2 2 + ￿ ￿ - £ - - + ￿ ￿ d d d d ( / ) ( )( ) .
which is satisfied for d 2 99 ‡  . . This shows that player 2 has no profitable deviation from
the first phase of his punishment equilibrium.
Finally note that .81 2 2 2
1 ‡ ‡ d
t V , so that player 2’s expected payoff in the initial period
of the punishment equilibrium is indeed no greater than .81. As was remarked above, this
shows that player 2 cannot gain by deviating along the equilibrium path.
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Harvard University




PROOF OF LEMMA 4 :  Given v v v = ( , ) 1 2  with v V ˛int




1 = ( ,..., ) be a
sequence of actions by player 1 such that there is a sequence of actions for player 2 such
that in G
N
0  the expected average payoff of player 1 is larger than v1 2 - e /  and the
expected average payoff of player 2 is larger than v2. (Clearly for N sufficiently large such
a sequence exists.)
Consider the KMN-fold repeated game G
KMN
0  in which player 2 has the time average
payoff as a payoff function. Again we can partition G
KMN




, , ,..., = . Denote by a a a 1 1 1 = ( ,..., ) the sequence of M repetitions of a1. Let
a1  be a (pure) action of player 1 that minmaxes the payoff of player 2 in pure strategies.
Further, let u
k




Let s 1 be the following strategy: in G
MN
0
1 , , player 1 chooses a1. In G
MN
0
2 ,  if
v u 1 1
1 2 - - < e h / , then player 1 again chooses a1 and so on. If for any k,
v u
k




CLAIM: Givene > 0 there are numbers h , K, N, M, and P with  P K / < e  such that
for any (time average) best response s 2 to s 1 the following is satisfied:
(i) if player 1 chooses a1 in G
MN k
0
, ,k K P = ,..., - 1  , then Pr( ) v u
k
1 1 1 - < > - e e  .
(ii) the fraction of stages k in which player 1 uses his punishment strategy is smaller than
e  with probability ( ) 1- e .
Assuming for the moment the truth of the claim, a straightforward upper hemi-
continuity argument shows that the claim remains true if s 2 is discounted best response23
with d 2  sufficiently close to 1. Moreover, the claim implies that the average payoff to
player 1 in G
KMN
0  is greater than v B 1 - e  where B is a positive constant independent of e .
This is the desired result.
To demonstrate the validity of the claim, first choose h e b < +
2 1 / ( ), where b  is a
fixed constant whose computation is described below.




( ) - +  the expected payoff of player 1 in G
MN k
0
,  given the
historyh
k MN ( ) - + 1 1. Given K and h  we can choose M sufficiently large, so that
(a) if v E u h
k k MN
1 1
1 1 2 2 - - >
- + | /
( ) e h  then punishment occurs with probability greater




(b) if v E u h
k k MN
1 1
1 1 2 - - <
- + | /
( ) e h for all k and for all histories h
k MN ( ) - + 1 1 such that
player 1 chooses a1 in G
MN k
0




,  is larger than ( ) 1-h .
Note that the utility loss from a punishment is bounded below by ( ) v u P 2 2 - ,
(v u 2 2 0 - > ), whereas the gain from a deviation is bounded above by u u 2 2 - , where u2
is the largest attainable payoff for player 2 in the stage game. Thus for appropriate choice
of P we have
(A1) v E u h
k k MN
1 1
1 1 2 2 - - <
- + | /
( ) e h
in all of the first K P -  stages for any best response of player 2 and for all histories
h
k MN ( ) - + 1 1 such that player 1 chooses a1 in G
MN k
0
, . Hence part (i) of the claim follows.
Now we establish part (ii) of the claim. Suppose to the contrary that player 2’s
(optimal) strategy triggers a punishment in more than an e  fraction of the first K P -24
stages with probability greater than e . We claim that this implies that a profitable devia-
tion exists. Suppose player 2 deviates so that v E u h
k k MN
1 1
1 1 2 - - <
- + | /
( ) e h for all
k=1,...,  K P - and for all histories h




inequality (A1) has to be satisfied for all k K P = - 1,..., , this deviation can be chosen so
that the loss in every stage is bounded above by h(max min ) u u 2 2 - . Note that (after the
deviation) the probability that a punishment occurs in any stage is smaller than h . Thus
player 2 also improves his average payoff over the first  K P -  stages by at least
( )( ) e h
2











player 2 gains from the deviation and part (ii) of the claim follows.  Q.E.D.25
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2 Celentani and Pesendorfer (1995) consider dynamic games with one large player and a
continuum of small but long lived players. Small players in this setting care about the
future but cannot influence the relevant history of the game and hence are strategically
myopic.
3 Thus the situation is similar to the “sequential contests” model of Fudenberg and Kreps
(1987).
4 Celentani (1995) uses multiple types of short-run players to get around the problem of
unobservable off-path behavior of the long-run player in repeated games with observable
actions. His approach can be extended to short run players who live for more than one
period.
5 Note that this payoff can be achieved if player 2 always chooses C and player 1 alternates
between C and D.
6 See, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (1983).29
                                                                                                                                                                    
7 These complications were addressed in the context of a myopic player 2 in Fudenberg
and Levine (1992). The restriction is largely a matter of technical convenience:  for player
1 to develop a reputation for mixed strategy punishments it would be necessary to allow a
continuum of types. Working with a continuum of types increases the complexity of the
notation substantially.
8 To reduce notation we do not track this dependence explicitly in the notation. Since we
do not need to discuss the N-period game with time-average payoffs, no confusion should
result.
9 Because we restrict attention to pure strategy commitment types, the worst punishment
that player 1 can hope to “teach” player 2 to fear is the pure-strategy minmax; this
restriction on punishments can result in a lower maximum payoff for player 1 than if mixed
punishments were considered .
10 The norm   may be taken to be ordinary Euclidean distance, where the probability
distribution over a finite set p() ￿  is viewed as a vector.
11 Note that, although s2 influences the probability of the various elements of M(K, ), it does not
influence the set itself.30
                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Moreover this example is robust to small changes in payoffs, and player 1 cannot obtain
the Stackelberg payoff by commitment to a mixed strategy. We thank a referee for finding
an error in a previous example, and for encouraging us to find a robust example.
13 Although sequential equilibrium has not been defined for infinite games, in the finitely
repeated versions of the two-types example considered here the outcomes of perfect
Bayesian equilibria (PBE) and sequential equilibria coincide (Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)). We use the simpler PBE concept because its conditions on beliefs are easier to
check.
14 Cripps and Thomas (1993) give a related example for the case where both players have
the same discount factor.
15 The bound on player 1’s payoff is derived as follows. If the public randomization
prescribe the play of (D,c), player 1 obtains 2 1 2 3
1 1 ( ) ( / ) - + d d  from deviating, and 0 1 1 +d v
from conforming, where  v1  is player 1’s equilibrium payoff; conforming is better than
deviating if  v1 is greater than . /. . 68 99 687 <   . Similar calculations show that this bound on
1’s equilibrium payoff implies that player 1 will not want to deviate when any of the other
three pure strategy profiles are supposed to be played. The computations for player 2 are
analogous.31
                                                                                                                                                                    
16 Play following simultaneous deviations is always irrelevant to the determination of
equilibrium.
17 Note that playing D  reveals that player 1 is the normal type.
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